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Abstract: Learning and stochastic evolutionary models provide a useful framework for analyzing
repeated interactions and experimentation among economic agents over time. They also provide sharp
predictions about equilibrium selection when multiplicity exists. This paper defines three convergence
measures, diffusion rate, expected waiting time and convergence rate, for characterizing the short-run,
medium-run and long-run behavior of a typical model of stochastic evolution. We provide tighter bounds
for each without making restrictive assumptions on the model and amount of noise as well as interac-
tion structure. We demonstrate how they can be employed to characterize evolutionary dynamics for
coordination games and strategic diffusion in networks. Application of our results to strategic diffusion
gives insights on the role played by the network topology. For example we show how networks made up
of cohesive subgroups speed up evolution between quasi-stable states while sparsely connected networks
have the opposite effect of favoring almost global stability.
Keywords: Learning and evolution, networks, diffusion rate, convergence rate, expected
waiting time
JEL classification: C73, D80
1. Introduction
Learning and evolutionary models provide a framework for modeling repeated interactions and
experimentation among economic agents over time. They also provide a useful framework for identi-
fying the most likely long-run outcomes in economic environments with multiple possible outcomes.1
The basic idea of learning and evolutionary dynamics is that agents learn their opponents’ play and
subsequently adjust their behavior over time. The adjustment process is such that each agent plays
their optimal strategy with higher probability and with a small probability randomizes among the
elements of the strategy set. The analysis then usually focuses on establishing the long-run behavior
∗Corresponding author: Opolot D. C., Maastricht University—UNU-MERIT, Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maas-
tricht, The Netherlands, (opolot@merit.unu.edu), Tel. +31 433884440, Fax +31 433884499.
1Several applications of learning and evolutionary game theory that have been developed include bargaining,
signaling, contagion and social innovation (e.g. Vega-Redondo (1997), Nöldeke and Samuelson (1997), Kandori and
Rob (1998), Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2008), Huck et al. (2012)).
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of the learning process, in which solution concepts such as stochastic stability are employed (Foster
and Young, 1990; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993; Ellison, 2000).
In the computation of stochastically stable outcomes (sets) it is customary to assume vanishing
probability of mistakes occurring. But as pointed out by Ellison (1993) and Sandholm (2010), this
assumption also implies that the convergence time to the long-run stationary distribution becomes
exceptionally long. More specifically, once the process gets trapped in one of the quasi-stable
states (possibly a socially undesirable one), the waiting time to exit its basin of attraction becomes
arbitrarily large for vanishing noise. If on the other hand the level of noise is allowed to be positive,
then the most stable outcomes are not necessary those that are predicted by stochastic stability. A
typical example of this case is when the probabilities of mistakes are state-dependent (Bergin and
Lipman, 1996).
The present paper aims to provide general convergence measures that can be employed to char-
acterize the short-run, medium-run and long-run behavior of a typical model of learning and evolu-
tionary game dynamics. More specifically, we define and provide bounds for diffusion rate, expected
waiting time and convergence rate as measures for short-run, medium-run and long-run behavior
respectively. The diffusion rate measures how fast or slow a given behavior, action or strategy
gets adopted by a subset or entire population once its minimum threshold has been reached. The
expected waiting time measures how long it takes the learning process to exit the boundary of the
basin of attraction of a given (quasi-) stable state or subset of states. The diffusion rate and ex-
pected waiting time can thus together be used to characterize evolution between two or more stable
states. The convergence rate on the other hand measures how fast the process attains its long-run
invariant distribution.
Unlike convergence measures in the literature, for example Ellison (1993), Binmore and Samuel-
son (1997), Montanari and Saberi (2010) and those generally employed in the computation of
stochastic stability (e.g. Young (1993), Kandori et al. (1993), Ellison (2000), and Staudigl (2012)
among others), the bounds we provide for diffusion rate, expected waiting time and convergence
rate do not rely on the assumption of vanishing noise. The generality of our framework also al-
lows for heterogeneity in the probabilities of mistakes across the population; for example it can be
state-dependent or depend on each agent’s position in the network in the case of local interactions.
We specifically derive bounds for diffusion rate in terms of the spectral properties of the interaction
structure and the parameters of the underlying game. The bound for the expected waiting time of
any given quasi-stable set is a function of the size of its basin of attraction and aggregate (average)
probability of the mistakes actually occurring. The direct implication is that the most stable set
is not necessarily that with the largest basin of attraction, which is contrary to the findings of the
case in which assumption of vanishing noise is made.
We demonstrate how these three convergence measures can be employed to characterize the
properties of an evolutionary process in binary coordination games and strategic diffusion in net-
works. There has been a growing body of literature on evolutionary dynamics and strategic dif-
fusion in networks for example that on deterministic best response dynamics (Morris, 2000; Lee
et al., 2003), noisy best response dynamics (Ellison, 1993; Blume, 1995; Alós-Ferrer and Weiden-
holzer, 2008; Young, 2011; Montanari and Saberi, 2010) and mean field best response dynamics
(Sandholm, 2001; Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer, 2008; Lelarge, 2012). Application of the results for
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the three convergence measures provides complementary findings to those in the above papers. For
example we find that the expected waiting time under global interactions grows exponentially with
population size while under local interactions it is independent of population size. But in addition
to this well established result, we are able to demonstrate how the presence of cohesive subgroups in
the network speeds up evolution between quasi-stable states (sets). This effect is different from that
of local interactions mentioned above. In fact, we find that sparsely connected networks reinforce
almost global stability and reduce the rate of inter-quasi-stable states transitions. For example in
binary coordination games, sparsely connected networks ensure faster evolution toward the risk-
dominant choice and reduce the likelihood of exiting from it. A combination of our results on
expected waiting time and diffusion rates also implies that strategic diffusion is generally faster
in networks consisting of cohesive subgroups. These cohesive subgroups should be small enough
to favor shorter expected waiting time but large enough and sufficiently connected to favor higher
diffusion rate within them.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the general
framework of stochastic evolutionary dynamics in general interaction structures. Section 3 is devoted
to the characterization of expected waiting time. Section 4 applies the results of Section 3 to binary
pure coordination games and Section 5 focuses on analysis of diffusion and convergence rates. All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The model
We consider a general class of n−person repeated games that exhibit strategic complementarity.
A set of agents N = {1, · · · , i, · · · , n} interact through a social network, which includes a possibility
of global interactions. We define the network of interactions in a graph theoretic manner. Let
G(n,E) be a graph with n vertices representing the number of agents and E edges linking different
pairs of agents, such that a graph gij defines the connection between i and j. If gij = 1 then a directed
link exists from i to j, and zero implies otherwise. G(n,E) is thus a directed network describing
the relationship of any one agent with every other agent in the population. The adjacency matrix
A of G(n,E) is defined as an n×n matrix with entries being the elements of gij . The neighborhood
of agent i, Ni, is defined as Ni = {j ∈ N |gij = 1}, and gives the set of players to which i is linked
to. The cardinality #Ni = ki, is the degree of i.
The set of actions Xi for each i ∈ N is finite. We denote the action chosen by each i ∈ N at
period t by xi,t, and for all xi,t ∈ Xi, xt = (x1,t, · · · , xn,t) denotes the strategy profile at t. Each
xt ∈ X = ∏ni=1Xi will also be referred to as the population state or simply the state of the learning
process at t, where X is the state space.
2.1. Payoff structure
For each i ∈ N , the functions ui : X → R define the payoffs of the game, such that ui(xi,x−i)
is the payoff of i when he plays xi and the other players follow strategy profile x−i. Games of
strategic complements that we consider include pure coordination games such as that in Table 1
below, and those with additively separable payoff functions. In the case of pure coordination games,
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let vi(xi, xj) be the payoff to i from playing action xi when his opponent j ∈ Ni plays actions xj .
Then the total payoff to i from playing xi when the other players follow strategy x−i is of the form.
(1) ui(xi,x−i) =
∑
j∈Ni
Jijvi(xi, xj),
The parameter Jij depends on whether players are randomly and uniformly matched with every
Table 1: Payoff structure for the pure coordination game between i and j
player j
A B
i A
a , a d , c
pl
ay
er
B c , d b , b
other in the population (global interactions) in which case Jij = 1n , or they interact locally through
a network. Note that local interactions can also be random and uniform, in which case Jij = 1ki .
Otherwise, Jij ∈ [0, 1] for all j ∈ Ni and for each i ∈ N .
The case of additively separable utilities is generally represented by linear-quadratic functions
of the form
(2) ui(xi,x−i) = si(xi) +
∑
j∈Ni
Sji (xi, xj).
where ui(xi) is the intrinsic utility to i from playing strategy xi and Sji (xi, xj) is the network
externality or social utility to i from playing action xi when the neighbor j’s action is xj . The
notable examples include the status model of Akerlof (1997), the social interactions model of Brock
and Durlauf (2001) and the neighborhood effects models discussed in Glaeser and Scheinkman
(2001).
2.2. Revision probabilities
Agents revise their actions following Darwinian dynamics. That is they respond myopically to
the past strategies of their opponents, playing the “optimal” strategy with high probability and with
a small probability they play that which is not necessarily optimal. By “optimal” we mean a strategy
that would be prescribed by a given learning rule. For example under Best-Reply dynamics it would
be the strategy which maximizes the associated utility function, and under imitation dynamics it
would be that which is the most successful in the population or neighborhood. We focus on the
case of Best-Reply dynamics in this paper.
The main results we derive generally apply to the dynamics with revision probabilities of the
form
(3) Pi(xt+1 = x|xt) = (1− εi(xt))BRi(xt+1 = x|xt) + εi(xt)Pi(xt+1 = x|xt)
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where BRi(xt+1 = x|xt) is the probability that i plays action x in the next period under best-reply
dynamics given that the current state is xt. That is
(4) BRi(xt+1 = x|xt) =
 1 if x ∈ arg maxxi∈Xi ui(xi,xt)0 otherwise.
For each i ∈ N , εi(x) is the state-dependent mutation rate, the probability that i randomizes among
the elements of Xi with the conditional distribution defined by Pi(x|x). The product Pi(x|xt) =
εi(xt)Pi(xt+1 = x|xt) is the probability of playing action x by mistake. We denote the vector of
mutation rates by ε = (ε1(x), · · · , εn(x)). Note that for each i ∈ N and xt ∈ X, ∑x∈Xi Pi(xt+1 =
x|xt) = 1.
In the application to strategic diffusion that will be provided in the sections that follow, we shall
focus on the logit dynamic rule, which is of the form
(5) Pi(xt+1 = x|xt) = exp [βui(x,xt)]∑
y∈Xi exp [βui(y,xt)]
where β > 0 is a parameter of randomness in agents’ decision process. The smaller β the more
prone agents are to mistakes. Unlike other evolutionary game models in which the probabilities of
mistakes are uniform (e.g. Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1993) and Ellison (1993)), logit dynamics
exhibits state-dependent mutation rates. More specifically, the probability of making an error is a
function of the payoff loss associated with that error. For example in the case of binary strategy
set X = {A,B}
(6) P(xi,t+1 = A|xt) = exp [βvi(A,xt)]exp [βvi(A,xt)] + exp [βvi(B,xt)] =
1
1 + exp[β∆vi]
.
where ∆vi = vi(B,xt) − vi(A,xt) is the payoff loss from playing strategy A rather than B. Logit
revision rule also allows for the possibility of probabilities of mistakes to depend on an agent’s
position in the network. Consider an example of a binary pure coordination game in Table 1 in
which a = 2, b = 1, c = d = 0. If the interactions are such that agents are randomly and uniformly
matched (that is J = 1n or
1
ki
) then the probability of making a mistake to play A when all agents
are initially playing B is
(7) Pi(x = A| ~B) = 11 + exp(β) for all i ∈ N .
where ~B implies all B population state. If on the other hand each agent’s payoff is the sum of
neighbors’ choices (that is J = 1) then
(8) Pi(x = A| ~B) = 11 + exp(βki) .
In which case highly connected agents have a lower probability of making an error than less connected
ones.
The evolution of the population state for a given interaction structure can thus be treated as a
Markov chain (X, Pε), defined on the finite set of states X with a fixed stochastic transition matrix
Pε whose elements are defined by
(9) Pε(x,y) =
n∏
i=1
Pi(xt+1 = yi|xt = x) for each yi ∈ y
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2.3. Recurrent classes and basins of attraction
The perturbed process (X, Pε) has a unique invariant (stationary) distribution piε = limt→∞ q0P tε,
where qt is the vector of probability mass functions at period t . The existence of a unique sta-
tionary distribution is a standard fact about aperiodic-irreducible Markov chains. The stationary
distribution describes the amount of time the process spends in each state in the long-run. The
communication recurrent classes of (X, Pε) are the limit sets of the identical process (X, P ) with-
out mistakes.2 In the coordination game of Table 1 above for example, the limit sets include the
singleton sets in which all players play strategy A and in which they all play strategy B. Generally,
the limit sets of (X, P ) can include sets that are cycles and those in which players use different
strategies. When the interactions are governed by a social network , the number of limit sets is en-
hanced. In particular, there will exists singleton limit sets in which strategies co-exists and different
cohesive subgroups adopt different strategies. The limit set of (X, P ) that results depends on the
initial state of the process. We denote the typical limit set of (X, P ) and hence recurrent class of
(X, Pε) by Ωj , and by Ω for the set of all possible Ωj .
The basin of attraction D(Ω) of a set Ω is defined as D(Ω) = {x ∈ X|P(∃T s.t xt ∈ Ω ∀ t >
T |x0 = x) = 1}. Without loss of generality, the model of mistakes is such that the basins of
attraction of the recurrent sets of (X, Pε) are equivalent in composition to those of the unperturbed
process (X, P ). Basins of attraction induce a partition on the state space into disjoint subsets
D(Ω) ⊂ X. Let x˜ be the shorthand for D(Ω) and let X˜ be the state space consisting of x˜’s as
its states. The behavior of the process (X, Pε) can thus be fully characterized by establishing the
measures of persistence and attractiveness of its recurrent classes and hence basins of attraction. In
the next section we focus on the measures related to persistence of recurrent classes.
3. Resistance and Expected waiting time
In this section, we define resistance and Expected waiting time as measures associated with the
persistence of recurrent classes. There are two factors that determine the persistence of a recurrent
class, the distance to the neighboring basins of attraction—diameter, and the actual aggregate
probability of mistakes occurring. Define the (normalized) diameter d(x˜i, x˜j) of the directed relation
x˜i → x˜j as the fraction of mistakes required to enter the basin of attraction of x˜j starting from the
recurrent class Ωi of x˜i. Equivalently, d(x˜i, x˜j) is the fraction of players required to simultaneously
play a different action by mistake for the process (X, Pε) to enter the boundary of x˜j given that it
is in the state x ∈ Ωi.
The collective probability associated with the diameter d(x˜i, x˜j) or a direct transition x˜i → x˜j
is captured by its average probability. Formally, let Pi(xt+1 = y|xt = x) for y ∈ y ∈ Ωj ∈ x˜j and
y /∈ x ∈ Ωi ∈ x˜i be the probability that i plays an action belonging to the state in a recurrent class
Ωj ∈ x˜j that is different from that played in the state belonging to the recurrent class Ωi ∈ x˜i,
2A set Ω ⊂ X is a limit set of (X, P ) if ∀y ∈ Ω, P(xt+1 ∈ Ω|xt = y) = 1, and that ∀y, z ∈ Ω, there exists a τ > 0
such that P(xt+τ = z|xt = y) > 0
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given that (X, Pε) is in x ∈ Ωi. We can the define the average probability PA(x˜i, x˜j) as
(10) PA(x˜i, x˜j) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pi(xt+1 = y|xt = x) for y ∈ y ∈ Ωj and y /∈ x ∈ Ωi
Given the diameter and the average probability, we then define the cost c(x˜i, x˜j) of a direct
transition x˜i → x˜j as c(x˜i, x˜j) = −d(x˜i, x˜j) ln (PA(x˜i, x˜j)). The resistance R(x˜i) is defined as the
minimum cost over all x˜j 6= x˜i. That is
R(x˜i) = minx˜j 6=x˜i
{c(x˜i, x˜j)}
Expected waiting time is a measure of how long it takes the process (X, Pε) to exit the basin of
attraction of a recurrent class once it has entered its boundaries. Equivalently, it is the measure of
the persistence of the limit sets of (X, P ) to perturbations and can thus be used to rank limit sets
in terms of how locally stable they are. Formally,
Definition 1: Let Ωi and Ωj be two recurrent classes of the process (X, Pε) with respective
basins of attraction x˜i and x˜j. Let n(x˜i, x˜j) be the number of agents that must play a different
action for the transition from Ωi to the boundary of x˜j to occur. Then the Expected waiting time
T (Ωi) of Ωi associated with such a transition is defined as
T (Ωi) = minx˜j 6=x˜i
E [min {t| n(x˜i, x˜j) ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n}]
The following theorem provides a lower bound on Expected waiting time.
Theorem 1: Let (X, Pε) be a model of learning with mistakes, and let Ωi and Ωj be any two of
its recurrent classes with corresponding basins of attraction x˜i and x˜j. Then
T (Ωi) ≥ en[f(d(x˜i))+R(x˜i)].
where f(a) = a ln
(
a
1−a
)
+ ln(1− a), and d(x˜i) = arg mind(x˜i,x˜j) c(x˜i, x˜j)
Proof. See Appendix A.1
The expected waiting time of a given recurrent class is an exponential function of the resistance
of its basin of attraction and the diameter d(x˜i) that minimizes the cost of exiting its basin of
attraction. Note that the size of basin of attraction is the minimum number (or fraction) of mistakes
required to exit its boundaries. That is for any x˜i ∈ X˜, the size of basin of attraction of x˜i is given
by minx˜j 6=x˜i d(x˜i, x˜j)n. The direct implication of Theorem 1 is that depending on the model of
mistakes, the recurrent class with the largest size of basin of attraction is not necessarily that with
the highest expected waiting time. This finding is contrary to that derived by assuming vanishing
noise such as Ellison (1993), in which the expected waiting time depends solely on the size of its
basin of attraction. In the next section we demonstrate how the result in Theorem 1 can be used
to characterize the behavior of an evolutionary process for binary pure coordination games.
4. Pure coordination games
This section applies the results of Theorem 1 to characterize the behavior of evolutionary game
dynamics in pure coordination games. We focus on the binary action case with payoff of the form
in Table 1, and that in which agents are randomly and uniformly matched (both global Jij = 1n and
local interactions Jij = 1ki ).
7
4.1. Global interactions
Consider the coordination game in Table 2 played by a sufficiently large number of players.
Under global interactions, there exists only two recurrent communication classes ~A and ~B with re-
spective basins of attraction A˜ and B˜. When agents interact randomly and uniformly, the transition
probabilities are identical and independent of their positions in the network. That is
(11) Pi(xt+1 = B|xt = ~A) = 11 + exp(β(1 + α))
for all i ∈ N . Implying that PA(A˜, B˜) = 1/(1+exp(β(1+α))). Similarly, PA(B˜, A˜) = 1/(1+exp(β)).
Table 2: For α > 0, A is both payoff and risk dominant action.
A B
A
1 + α , 1 + α 0 , 0
B
0 , 0 1 , 1
The corresponding normalized diameters are d(A˜, B˜) = 1+α2+α and d(B˜, A˜) =
1
2+α . That is starting
from ~A, at least a fraction 1+α2+α of the population must first switch to playing B for a global cascade
to ~B to occur. Similarly 12+α must first adopt action A for a global cascade to ~A to occur. The
corresponding resistances are thus
R(A˜) = 1 + α2 + α ln
(
1 + eβ(1+α)
)
R(B˜) = 12 + α ln
(
1 + eβ
)
Consequently, the expected waiting time to exit each basin of attraction are given by
T ( ~A) ≥ en[ 1+α2+α ln(1+eβ(1+α))+f( 1+α2+α)] > en[ 12+α ln(1+eβ)+f( 12+α)] ≤ T ( ~B)
Implying that under global interactions the expected waiting time is an exponential function of
the population size. It also implies that for a finite population, the most likely outcome for logit
dynamics under global interactions is that in which all agents play the risk-dominant action. This
however is not necessarily true for other learning rules or multi-action coordination games.
4.2. Local interactions: Deterministic networks
The results in Theorem 1 can be employed to gain a richer understanding on how the network
topology affects the process of evolutionary game dynamics. The network topology affects both the
diameters and average probabilities associated with inter-basin of attraction transitions. For the
case of deterministic and/or simple network topologies, the diameter and average probabilities can
be computed by considering the contributions of each player relative to their degree. To begin with,
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consider n agents arranged in a circle such that each interacts with two others on the left and right.
If agents play the pure coordination game in Table 2 and that they are randomly and uniformly
matched with their neighbors, then the average probabilities are as above. For α > 0, we have that
d(A˜, B˜) = 1 and d(B˜, A˜) = 1n . That is, starting from ~A each agent requires both neighbors to switch
to B before doing so. Hence, to evolve from ~A to ~B all agents must simultaneously switch to B.
On the other hand, evolving from from ~B to ~A requires only a single mutation. The corresponding
expected waiting times then become.
T ( ~A) ≥ en ln(1+eβ(1+α)) > Celn(1+eβ) ≤ T ( ~B)
where C = enf( 1n ). Clearly, as n increases, the only most likely outcome is ~A, in which all agents
play the payoff and risk dominant action. Compared to the global interactions case above, the
expected waiting time to exit B˜ is independent of the population size. A result that has also been
established by other authors such as Ellison (1993) and Lee et al. (2003).
Now consider a set of eight agents whose interactions are governed by the network topology in
Figure 1, and playing a pure coordination game in Table 2. The network can be divided into two
cohesive subgroups g1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and g2 = {5, 6, 7, 8}. A player i belongs to a given cohesive
subgroup if and only if at least half of i’s interactions are with members of that subgroup. In
addition to ~A and ~B, there are two additional recurrent classes; ~A1 and ~A2 in which all members of
g1 play A while those in g2 all play B and vise versa for ~A2. The corresponding normalized diameters
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
Figure 1: A general network with two cohesive subgroups
are then given by d(B˜, A˜1) = 14 , d(B˜, A˜2) =
1
8 , d(A˜, A˜1) =
3
8 , d(A˜, A˜2) =
3
8 , e.t.c. Such that the
resistances become R(A˜) = 38 ln
(
1 + eβ(1+α)
)
, R(B˜) = 18 ln
(
1 + eβ
)
, R(A˜1) = 18 ln
(
1 + eβ(1+α)
)
,
R(A˜2) = 14 ln
(
1 + eβ(1+α)
)
. The expected waiting time for each recurrent class can then be obtained
by directly substituting for the respective resistance into the expression of Theorem 1.
If each of the eight agents were to interact globally, then the resistance of A˜ and B˜ would
respectively be R(A˜) = 1+α2+α ln
(
1 + eβ(1+α)
)
and R(B˜) = 12+α ln
(
1 + eβ
)
. Which for α > 0 are
generally greater than those for the network topology of Figure 1. Similarly, when compared to
the case in which the eight agents are arranged in a circle, in which case R(A˜) = ln
(
1 + eβ(1+α)
)
and R(B˜) = 1n ln
(
1 + eβ
)
, the resistance of the transition ~A → ~B is higher than for the case of
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Figure 1. Hence the presence of such cohesive subgroups, though generally enhances the number
of recurrent classes (some of which involve co-existence of choices), speeds up evolutions between
them.
In general, it is possible to establish the most likely outcome (at least for binary coordination
games) based on the the distribution of degrees in the population. Consider the binary coordination
game in Table 1 and let
(12) ηA =
v(B,B)− v(A,B)
v(B,B)− v(A,B) + v(A,A)− v(B,A)
such that ηB = 1− ηA. That is ηA is the fraction of neighbors that each agent requires to switch to
A before doing so, and vise versa for ηB. Let dme be the smallest integer not less than m. It is easy
to see that for any network G, each agent whose degree is such that ki = dηBkie must be among
those that form a threshold subset of agents required to switch to B for a global cascade to ~B to
occur. The direct implication is that any arbitrary interaction structure for which the maximum
degree kmax = dηBkmaxe, the state ~A is the most likely outcome in a long-run when the population
size is sufficiently large. A typical example is the cyclic interaction above, whenever ηB > 12 .
4.3. Random networks
Most real world networks assume complex structures. Several authors have proposed various
ways to capture the properties of such networks e.g. clustering coefficient and degree distribution.
For our purpose, the degree distribution is the most suitable for capturing the effect of network
topology on the diameter and average probabilities (hence resistance and expected waiting time) of
inter-basin of attraction transitions. The degree distribution P = {p(k)}k≥0 describes the number
of agents in the population with a given degree. We denote by 〈k〉 for average degree. The following
definitions related to the degree distribution are useful for the results that follow.
Definition 2: Let G and G′ be two networks with respective degree distributions P and P ′.
(i) A degree distribution P is said to first order stochastically dominate (FOSD) P ′ if∑Kk=0 p(k) ≤∑K
k=0 p
′(k) for 1 ≤ K ≤ ∞. Or for any non-decreasing function f : R→ R,
∞∑
k=0
f(k)p′(k) ≤
∞∑
k=0
f(k)p(k).
(ii) A degree distribution P is said to second order stochastically dominate (SOSD) P ′ if for any
non-decreasing concave function f : R→ R, ∑∞k=0 f(k)p′(k) ≤∑∞k=0 f(k)p(k).
(ii) A degree distribution P is said to be a mean preserving spread (MPS) of P ′ if P ′ SOSD P
and that both have the same mean.
The following proposition provides the relationship between degree distributions and expected
waiting time.
Proposition 1: Let G and G′ be two networks with respective degree distributions P and P ′.
Let the underlying game be the binary coordination game of Table 1 in which A is the risk-dominant
actions (i.e. ηB > 12), and let TG( ~B) denote the expected waiting time to exit B˜ given the network
G. For a given value of ηB and revision rule,
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(i) if P FOSD (or SOSD) P ′, then TG( ~B) > TG′( ~B)
(ii) if P MPS P ′ or P ′ FOSD P , then TG( ~A) > TG′( ~A)
Proof. See Appendix A.2
The direct implication of Proposition 1 is that not only do sparsely connected networks (or
presence of less connected agents) speed up evolution towards the state in which all agents play
risk-dominant action, they also increase the expected waiting time to evolve away from it. Hence,
for finite populations sparsely connected networks favor selection of risk-dominant equilibrium.
5. Convergence and diffusion rates
In this section, we provide convergence measures that can be employed to characterize other
aspects of evolutionary game dynamics that are not directly captured by expected waiting time.
More specifically, the convergence rate as a measure of the long-run behavior of the process and
the diffusion rate as the measure of how fast an action, behavior or strategy diffuses across the
population once its threshold value has been reached. The diffusion rate therefore captures the
dynamics within a given basin of attraction once the process has entered its boundaries.
5.1. Long-run behavior
The definition for the convergence rate that we adopt is based on the notion that all finite state
Markov chains attain heir stationary distribution at an exponential rate Seneta (1997). That is
(13)
∣∣∣∣∣∣P tε(xt0 , .)− piε∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Crtε
where C is some constant, r < 1, and ||.|| is the total variation distance. The following proposition
defines and provides a bound for the rate at which the process (X, Pε) converges to its long-run
stationary distribution.
Theorem 2: Given any initial state xt0 of the process (X, Pε), the convergence rate 1 − rε of
(X, Pε) is given by
(14) 1− rε = lim sup
t→∞
∣∣∣∣∣∣P tε(xt0 , .)− piε∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1t ≥ 12
( 1
T (Ω∗)
)2
where Ω∗ = arg min
Ω∈Ω
T (Ω)
Proof. See Appendix A.3
Theorem 2 provide a lower bound for the convergence rate of an evolutionary process to station-
arity in term of the maximum expected waiting time. Following from the results on the expected
waiting time above, evolutionary processes on networks made up of cohesive subgroups generally
attain their stationary distribution faster than global those under global interactions. In some cases
in which the the network structure leads to almost global convergence to risk-dominant choice,
such as the example of cyclic network structure given above, the convergence rate is faster global
interactions that local interactions.
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5.2. Diffusion rate
This section is devoted to deriving bounds for diffusion rate in terms of the parameters of the
network topology and the underlying game. Given the normalized adjacency matrix A associated
with the network of interactions, let ρ(A ) = (λ1, · · · , λn) be its eigenvalue spectrum ordered in such
away that λ1 = 1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λn. Denote by Σε for the an agent’s individual transition matrix
given an opponent’s actions. That is let P(xj |xi) be the probability that a given player plays action
xj ∈ X in the next period given that his opponent is playing xi ∈ X in the current period. Then
Σε is given by
(15) Σε =

P(x1|x1) P(x2|x1) · · · P(xm|x1)
P(x1|x2) P(x2|x2) · · · P(xm|x2)
...
... . . .
...
P(x1|xm) P(x2|xm) · · · P(xm|xm)

Let also ρ(Σε) = (ϑ1, · · · , ϑm) be the eigenvalue spectrum of Σε. The following theorem provides
bounds for diffusion rate in binary coordination games.
Theorem 3: Consider a set of n agents playing a binary coordination in Table 1 and let the
evolutionary dynamics be that prescribed by (3). Then the diffusion rate 1− rD of an action, say A
once its threshold has been reached is such that
λ2ϑ2 ≤ rD ≤ λ2
Proof. See Appendix A.4
The second eigenvalue of Σε, ϑ2 is a function of the underlying payoff structure and the model
of mistakes, which in the case of logit dynamics depends on β. A bound on λ2 can be established
through its relationship with the graph conductance φ(G). We give examples for specific graphs
below.
Example: The following relation between second eigenvalue of a network graph G, λ2(G) and
φ(G) can be derived from Cheeger inequality: See Appendix A.5 for more detail concerning the
relation plus derivations for the following examples.
(16) λ2(G) ≤ 1− φ(G)
2
2 .
(i) Complete network (Gcom), a network structure in which every vertex is connected to every
other vertex: λ2(Gcom) ≤ 78 .
(ii) 1 − D cyclic network (Gcyc), a network in which vertices are arranged in a circle and every
vertex is connected to two other neighboring vertices: λ2(Gcyc) ≤ n2−2n2 .
(iii) 2D n× n lattice network (G2D), a lattice structure constructed with periodic boundary con-
ditions such that each agent is connected to 4 neighbors: λ2(G2D) ≤ 16n2−116n2 .
(iv) Random d-regular network (Gd−r), a network structure in which each of the n vertices is
connected to d other vertices chosen at random: λ2(Gd−r) ≤ 78 .
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(v) Newman’s small world network (Gnsw), a network structure in which the mean shortest-path
between nodes increases sufficiently slowly (logarithmically) as a function of the number of
nodes in the network: λ2(Gnsw) = 1−O
(
c
(lnn)2
)
, where c is a constant.
(vi) For a network with at least two cohesive subgroups, we have 78 < λ2(G) < 1
Proof. See Appendix A.5
In general, densely connected and random networks have higher second largest eigenvalues com-
pared to sparesely connected network. The direct implication of this result, together with the
finding on expected waiting time, is that diffusion of strategic behavior or choices is faster in net-
works made up of cohesive subgroups. These cohesive subgroups should be small enough to favor
shorter expected waiting time but large enough and sufficiently connected to favor higher diffusion
rate within them.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper develops convergence measures for characterizing the short-run, medium-run and
long-run behavior of stochastic evolutionary models. We provide tighter bounds for diffusion rate,
expected waiting time and convergence rate as respective measures for the speed at which strategic
behavior spreads across the population, the time for a transition between quasi-stable states and the
the speed at which the process attains its invariant distribution. The bounds we derive do not rely on
restrictive assumption concerning the model of mistakes, underlying game and interaction structure.
Unlike the frameworks in the literature that impose assumptions on the model of mistakes, we find
that the expected waiting time to exit the boundaries of a given basin of attraction depends both
on its size and average probability of mistakes. The direct implication is that the quasi-stable
states with the largest size of basin of attraction are not necessarily the most stable. This finding
suggests the possibility of multiple long-run outcomes in models of stochastic evolution as opposed
to the unique predictions always derived by employing stochastic stability as a solution concept.
Our future work will focus on applying the results on expected waiting time to derive a general
treatment of stochastic stability as an equilibrium selection method.
We have applied results from the three convergence measures to characterize strategic diffusion
in networks. Several insights into the effect of the network topology on the diffusion of strategic
behavior are established. For example we find that the expected waiting time under global inter-
actions grows exponentially with population size while under local interactions it is independent of
population size. But in addition to this well established result, we are able to demonstrate how
the presence of cohesive subgroups in the network speeds up evolution between quasi-stable states.
This effect is different from that of local interactions. We find that sparsely connected networks
reinforce almost global stability and reduce the rate of inter-quasi-stable states transitions.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
From the definition of expected waiting time, we have that
(A.1) E [min {t| n(x˜i, x˜j) ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n}] = 1P(n(x˜i, x˜j) ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n)
The objective is therefore to place a bound on P(n(x˜i, x˜j) ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n. The derivation follows a
combinatorial argument, where we first transform individual transition probabilities into Boolean
random variables. That is, let Pi(x˜i, x˜j) = Pi(xt+1 = y|xt = x) for y ∈ y ∈ Ωj ∈ x˜j and
y /∈ x ∈ Ωi ∈ x˜i. Define a parameter p ∈ [0, 1] such that if Pi(x˜i, x˜j) ≥ p agent i chooses y ∈ y or
else he does not. This leads to a random variable denoted by Ii, which is equal to one if i chooses
y and zero otherwise. Let I = (I1, · · · , In) be the realization of Ii for all i ∈ N . From the definition
of n(x˜i, x˜j), we then rephrase our problem as the case of bounding P
(∑n
i=1 Ii ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n
)
.
Now, consider the problem of a binomial independent sampling over the vector I, Bin(n, σ),
such that with probability σ, Ii is picked and with 1− σ it is not. Denote the n-dimensional vector
generated by Bin(n, σ) by u = (u1, · · · , un), where P(ui = 1) = σ and P(ui = 0) = 1 − σ. We
can then regard the problem of bounding P
(∑n
i=1 Ii ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n
)
as determining the probability
of “efficiently” finding a subset S ⊆ N of at least d(x˜i, x˜j)n players all of whom simultaneously
switch to play y. Define an event ∀i∈SIi = 1; that is all members of S choose y, and consequently
P(∀i∈SIi = 1) is the probability that all i ∈ S choose y. We can then define the following conditional
relation,
(A.2) P
(
n∑
i=1
Ii ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n
)
≤ E
[∀i∈SIi = 1]
E
[∀i∈SIi = 1|∑ni=1 Ii ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n] ,
where the expectations are taken over the vector u. Since the elements of u are a result of indepen-
dent sampling, we have
E[∀i∈SIi = 1] ≤
∑
S⊆N
(
σ#S(1− σ)n−#S
∏
i∈S
Pi(x˜i, x˜j)
)
= E∀ui∈u
[ n∏
i=1
(Pi(x˜i, x˜j)|ui)
]
,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that P(∀i∈SIi = 1) ≤ ∏i∈S Pi(x˜i, x˜j). It follows that,
E
[∀i∈SIi = 1] ≤ n∏
i=1
Eui
[
Pi(x˜i, x˜j)|ui
]
=
n∏
i=1
(
σPi(x˜i, x˜j) + 1− σ
)
(A.3)
If we define PA(x˜i, x˜j) = 1n
∑n
i=1 Pi(x˜i, x˜j) as the arithmetic average of all Pi(x˜i, x˜j), then from the
convex relation between the logarithms of the arithmetic and geometric means,
1
n
n∑
i=1
ln
(
σPi(x˜i, x˜j) + 1− σ
) ≤ ln (σPA(x˜i, x˜j) + 1− σ)
E
[∀i∈SIi = 1] ≤ n∏
i=1
(
σPi(x˜i, x˜j) + 1− σ
) ≤ (σPA(x˜i, x˜j) + 1− σ)n(A.4)
To obtain the bound for E
[∀i∈SIi = 1|∑ni=1 Ii ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n], recall that 1− σ is the probability
that ui = 0. We also note that if at least d(x˜i, x˜j)n of the elements of u are ones, then there are at
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most n− d(x˜i, x˜j)n zeros, that is at most n− d(x˜i, x˜j)n agents are not in set S. It follows that
(A.5) E
[
∀i∈SIi = 1|
n∑
i=1
Ii ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n
]
≥ (1− σ)(1−d(x˜i,x˜j))n
Equations (A.4) together with (A.5) when substituted into (A.2) yield,
(A.6) P
(
n∑
i=1
Ii ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n
)
≤
((
σPA(x˜i, x˜j) + 1− σ
)
(1− σ)(1−d(x˜i,x˜j))
)n
,
If we choose σ that optimizes the quantity g =
(
σPA(x˜i,x˜j)+1−σ
)
(1−σ)(1−d(x˜i,x˜j)) (by equating the derivative to zero
and solving for σ) and substituting back gives
(A.7) P
(
n∑
i=1
Ii ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n
)
≤
((
PA(x˜i, x˜j)
d(x˜i, x˜j)
)d(x˜i,x˜j)(1− PA(x˜i, x˜j)
1− d(x˜i, x˜j)
)1−d(x˜i,x˜j))n
Re-expressing (A.7) in exponential form results to
(A.8) P(n(x˜i, x˜j) ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n) ≤ e
n
[
d(x˜i,x˜j) ln
(
PA(x˜i,x˜j)
d(x˜i,x˜j)
)
+(1−d(x˜i,x˜j)) ln
(
1−PA(x˜i,x˜j)
1−d(x˜i,x˜j)
)]
Note that each Pi(x˜i, x˜j) = Pi(xt+1 = y|xt = x ∈ Ωi)  1, hence ln(1 − PA(x˜i, x˜j))  ln(1 −
d(x˜i, x˜j)) such that
(A.9) P(n(x˜i, x˜j) ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n) ≤ e−n[f(d(x˜i,x˜j))−d(x˜i,x˜j) ln(PA(x˜i,x˜j))]
where f(d(x˜i, x˜j)) = d(x˜i, x˜j) ln
(
d(x˜i,x˜j)
1−d(x˜i,x˜j)
)
+ ln (d(x˜i, x˜j)). Recall that the cost of the transition
x˜i → x˜j is
c(x˜i, x˜j) = −d(x˜i, x˜j) ln (PA(x˜i, x˜j)) .
It then follows from the definition of the resistance R(x˜i) of x˜i that
T (Ωi) = minx˜j 6=x˜i
E [min {t| n(x˜i, x˜j) ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n}]
≤ min
x˜j 6=x˜i
en[f(d(x˜i,x˜j))+c(x˜i,x˜j)]
= e−n[f(d(x˜i))+R(x˜i)](A.10)
where d(x˜i) = arg mind(x˜i,x˜j) c(x˜i, x˜j).
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1
(i) For a given value of ηA < 12 the quantity d(B˜, A˜) is an increasing function of network
connectivity. For example when the network is complete network (global interactions) d(B˜, A˜) = ηB
and for cyclic interactions d(B˜, A˜) = 1n . We thus have that d(B˜, A˜) := f(〈k〉), where f is an
increasing function. Since P FOSD (or SOSD) P ′ implies that 〈k〉 > 〈k′〉, it follows that d(B˜, A˜)
under G is greater than d′(B˜, A˜) under G′. When agents are matched randomly and uniformly the
average probabilities PA(B˜, A˜) are identical for both networks. Implying that TG( ~B) > TG′( ~B).
(ii) Given 12 < ηB < 1, all agents for whom ki = dηBkie require all their neighbors to switch
to B before doing so. Denote by NB(G) for the subset of agents for whom ki = dηBkie given the
network G. That is
NB(G) = {i ∈ N : ki = dηBkie}.
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Denote kmax for the maximum k for which k = dηBke. We then have that
nA(G) = #NA(G) =
kmax∑
k=0
p(k)
such that
dG(A˜, B˜) ≥ nA(G)
n
=
∑kmax
k=0 p(k)
n
It then implies that for P ′ FOSD P or P MPS P ′, there exists a value of kmax sufficiently large
such that
dG(A˜, B˜) ≥
∑kmax
k=0 p(k)
n
>
∑kmax
k=0 p
′(k)
n
≤ dG′(A˜, B˜).
Implying that TG( ~A) > TG′( ~A).
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof follows from linear algebra (see for example Jerrum and Sinclair (1989) for general
Markov chains). We drop the subscript on Pε for notational convenience. Recall that Pε is reversible.
piε(x)Pε(x,y) = piε(y)Pε(y,x) ∀x,y ∈ X(A.11)
We can define an equivalent symmetric matrix M such that
(A.12) M(x,y) =
√
piε(x)
piε(y)
Pε(x,y)
Denote the diagonal matrix with elements piε(x) by D such that
(A.13) M = D
1
2PεD
− 12
Let hi = D−
1
2ui, (where ui’s are eigenfunctions of M) it follows that hi is an eigenfunction of Pε
corresponding to eigenvalue µi, and that hi’s are orthonormal with respect to piε. That is
(A.14) Pεhi = PεD−
1
2ui = D−
1
2
(
D
1
2PεD
− 12
)
ui = D−
1
2Mui = D−
1
2µiui = µihi.
To prove orthonormality of the functions hi’s with respect to piε, its useful to take note of the
following definition of the inner product. Let 〈., .〉 denote the inner product on RX, that is
(A.15) 〈h, g〉 =
∑
x∈X
h(x)g(x),
then we can define the inner product with respect to the distribution piε as
(A.16) 〈h, g〉piε =
∑
x∈X
h(x)g(x)piε(x).
Let δi,j denote the Dirac delta function (that is δi,j = 1 if and only if i = j), then
δi,j = 〈ui,uj〉 =
〈
D
1
2hi, D
1
2hj
〉
=
∑
x∈X
piε(x)
1
2h(x)piε(x)
1
2 g(x) =
∑
x∈X
h(x)piε(x)g(x) = 〈h, g〉piε .
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Note that P tε(x,y) is the x,y element of P tε, implying that P tε(x,y) = (P tεδy)(x); where δy(x)
is a Dirac function assuming the value of unity for x = y and zero otherwise. Notice also that
δy belongs to the inner product space V = (RX, 〈., .〉piε), and since the set {h1, · · · , h|X|} is an
orthonormal basis of V, then δy can be written via basis decomposition as
(A.17) δy =
η∑
i=1
〈δy, hi〉piε hi =
η∑
i=1
hi(y)piε(y)hi
where η is the cardinality of X. Substituting (A.17) and P tεhi = µtihi gives P tε(x,y) as
(A.18) P tε(x,y) =
η∑
i=1
hi(y)piε(y)µtihi(x) = piε(y) +
η∑
i=2
hi(y)piε(y)µtihi(x)
It then follows that,
lim sup
t→∞
∣∣∣∣∣∣P tε(x0, .)− piε(.)∣∣∣∣∣∣1/t = lim sup
t→∞
1
2
∑
y∈X
η∑
i=2
∣∣hi(y)piε(y)hi(x0)µti|
1/t
= |µ2| lim sup
t→∞
1
2
∑
y∈X
(
|h2(y)piε(y)h2(x0)|+ 1|µ2|t
η∑
i=3
∣∣hi(y)piε(y)hi(x0)µti|
)1/t
= |µ2|(A.19)
Recall that each basin of attraction x˜ ⊂ X and sets of basins of attraction W ⊂ X˜ induce a
partition on Pε. Denote by φ(Pε,W ) for the conductance of the partition on Pε induced by W .
That is
(A.20) φ(Pε,W ) =
1∑
x∈W
pi(x)
∑
x∈W
∑
y∈W c
pi(x)Pε(x,y).
where W c is the complement of W . The conductance of Pε is then defined by
(A.21) φ(Pε) = min
W⊂X∑
x∈W pi(x)≤ 12
φ(Pε,W )
If the basins of attraction are of sufficiently large sizes, then
(A.22) φ(Pε) = min
x˜i⊂X˜∑
x∈x˜i
pi(x)≤ 12
φ(Pε, x˜i)
Given the definition of conductance of Pε, the following relationship holds (Jerrum and Sinclair,
1989)
(A.23) µ2 ≤ 1− φ(Pε)
2
2
From (A.20) and letting piε(x˜i) =
∑
x∈x˜i pi(x), we then have that
φ(Pε, x˜i)) =
1
piε(x˜i)
∑
x∈x˜i
pi(x)
∑
y∈x˜ci
Pε(x,y)
≥ min
x∈x˜i
∑
x˜j 6=x˜i
∑
y∈x˜ci
Pε(x,y)
≥
∑
x˜j 6=x˜i
P(n(x˜i, x˜j) ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n)
≥ max
x˜i 6=x˜i
P(n(x˜i, x˜j) ≥ d(x˜i, x˜j)n) = 1
T (Ωi)
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Implying that
(A.24) φ(Pε) = min
x˜i∈X˜
φ(Pε, x˜i)) = maxΩi∈Ω
1
T (Ωi)
A.4. Proof of Theorem 3
We begin by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Let µ3 and µ4 be the third and fourth largest eigenvalues of Pε. Then the diffusion
rate rD is such that µ4 ≤ rD ≤ µ3.
Proof. Recall that the partition of the state space X into basins of attractions induced by the
regular perturbation on P , makes Pε nearly decomposable. In the case of binary action set say
X = {A,B}, Pε is nearly decomposable into diagonal block matrices l = {1, 2} describing transitions
within elements of the basins of attractions A˜ and B˜. We can write eigenvalue spectrum of Pε as
ρ(Pε) = (µ11 , µ21 , · · · , µn1 , µ12 , · · · , µn2) . Where nl is the size of block matrix l. µ11 is the largest
eigenvalue of the first diagonal block matrix also corresponding to the leading eigenvalue of the the
entire matrix. µn1 is the least eigenvalue of the first block matrix. µ12 and µn2 are the leading and
least eigenvalues of the second block matrix.
Let rjl and wjl be the right and left eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalue µjl . By
expressing Pε in its eigendecomposition form, the dynamic process can be expressed as
(A.25) qt = q0r11wT11 +
n1∑
j=2
µtj1q0rj1w
T
j1 + µ
t
12q0r12w
T
12 +
n2∑
j=2
µtj2q0rj2w
T
j2
First note that µ12 > µjl for all j ≥ 2. Implying that the convergence rate of the entire adoptive
process in a long-run according to Proposition 2, is given by
r = lim sup
t→∞
∣∣∣∣∣∣P tε(xt0 , .)− pi∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1t = µ12 .
Since the leading eigenvalues of each block matrix are such that µ11 = 1 and µ12 is very close to unity,
in a medium-run the varying terms in (A.25) are the second and fourth, and the first and third terms
stay fairly constant. Once the process enters a given diagonal block matrix (boundaries of a given
basin of attraction) it attains a quasi-stationary distribution. The quasi-stationary distribution
places most weight on the most stable outcome (quasi-stable state) within the basin of attraction,
which in the case of binary coordination games would ~A and ~B. The rate at which (X, Pε) converges
to its quasi-stationary distribution within a given basin of attraction is thus approximately equal
to the rate at which a given action (say A) gets globally adopted through best response.
Denote by piA and piB for the quasi-stationary distribution within the basin of attraction of ~A
and ~B respectively. The convergence rates for each block matrix are then
r = lim sup
t→τ
∣∣∣∣∣∣P tε(xt0 , .)− pi1∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1t = µ21 .
r = lim sup
t→τ
∣∣∣∣∣∣P tε(xt0 , .)− pi2∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1t = µ22
where τ is the period at which piA and piB are attained. It then follows that
µ4 = µ22 ≤ rD ≤ µ21 = µ3.
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We can derive an approximation for the relationship between µ3 and µ4 with the parameters of
the underlying game and interaction structure by considering the following linearized evolutionary
process. The transition matrix Pε can be linearized by acting on it an operator called the event
matrix (Asavathiratham, 2001). Denote the event matrix and its Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse by
Ψ and Ψ−1 respectively. Ψ is derived by stacking into rows all possible realizations or state vectors
written in basis vector form. For example in the case of two players and binary action set in which
there are 4 possible realizations, the event matrix becomes
(A.26) Ψ =

1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1

where the first row corresponds to the state in which both players play action A, and so forth. For
any finite number of players and action set, the following equivalence holds.
(A.27) PεΨ = ΨΠε
where Πε is the linearized form of Pε, a transition matrix defined as
(A.28) Πε = A T ⊗ Σε
Given Πε and Pε, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2: Let ρ(Πε) = θ1, · · · , θ2n, ρ(A ) = (λ1, · · · , λn) and ρ(Σε) = (ϑ1, ϑ2) denote the
eigenvalues of Πε, ρ(A ) and ρ(Σε) respectively. Then
1. If µ1 and θ1 are the unique largest eigenvalues of Pε and Πε respectively, then µ1 = θ1 = 1.
2. ρ(Πε) = λiϑj ∀λi ∈ ρ(A ), ϑj ∈ ρ(Σε)
Proof. Let fi be the right eigenvector of Pε corresponding to eigenvalue µi, and recall that the
relation PεΨ = ΨΠε. It follows that
PεΨf1 = ΨΠεf1
where f1 is the eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue µ1. Since µ1 = 1, we thus have PεΨf1 = Ψf1,
which is true if and only if Πεf1 = f1. That is θ1 = µ1 = 1.
For part 2 of the lemma see Horn and Johnson (1990, page 245, Theorem 4.2.12)
Since
(A.29) qtΨ = q0P tεΨ = q0ΨΠtε
It follows that µ4 ≈ λ2ϑ2 and µ3 ≈ λ2.
A.5. Proofs for Example
Let G = (n,E) be a graph or network of n vertices. Denote by S a subset of n and by e(S, n−S)
as the number of interactions (for a weighted network graph its is the sum of weighted interactions)
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between S and its complement n− S. Also let d(S) denote the total degree of subset S. Then the
conductance of G
(A.30) φ(G) = min
S,#S≤n2
e(S, n− S)
d(S)
where #S denotes the size of the set. For regular network graphs (in which all vertices have the
same degree), it is shown by (Alon and Milman, 1985) that
(A.31) λ2(G) ≤ 1− φ(G)
2
2 .
For a complete graph, since every vertex is connected to every other vertex, we have that every
vertex in S is connected to all other vertices in n−S. This implies that e(S, n−S) = #S×#(n−S) =
#S × (n−#S), and d(S) = n×#S such that
(A.32) φ(Gcom) = min
S,#S≤n2
#S × (n−#S)
n×#S ≥
1
2 ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that #S ≤ n2 . We thus have that
(A.33) λ2(Gcom) ≤ 78
In the case of a 1−D cyclic network, e(S, n− S) = 2, and d(S) = 2×#S such that
(A.34) φ(Gcyc) = min
S,#S≤n2
2
2×#S ≥
2
n
.
Hence λ2(Gcyc) ≤ n2−2n2 .
2D network: Let the composition of S be chosen in such a way that the peripheral vertices
(vertices at the perimeter or boundary of S) contain approximately one edge each connecting it to
the set n − S. Since it is a 2-dimensional structure there should be approximately √#S vertices
forming such a boundary. This implies that e(S, n− S) ≈ √#S, and d(S) = 4×#S such that
(A.35) φ(G2D) = min
S,#S≤n22
√
#S
4×#S ≥
√
2
4n .
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
√
#S ≤
√
n2
2 . It follows that
λ2(G2D) ≤ 16n
2 − 1
16n2 .
Random d-regular network: Since for each vertex the vertices to which it is connected are
chosen at random, and that the maximum size of S is n2 , then a typical vertex in S is connected to
approximately d×#(n−S)n other vertices in n−S such that e(S, n−S) ≈ d×#S#(n−S)n . We thus have
(A.36) φ(Gd−r) = min
S,#S≤n2
d×#S#(n−S)
n
d×#S ≥ 1.
(A.37) λ2(Gd−r) ≤ 78
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For Newman’s small world networks see Durrett (2006).
Recall the definition of a cohesive subgroups.
(A.38) d(l, n− l)
d(l) ≤ 1− δ,
1
2 < δ < 1
Equation (A.38) together with (A.30) and (A.31) imply
(A.39) λ2 = 1− 12(1− δ)
2,
1
2 < δ < 1
such that for δ = 12 , λ2 =
7
8 , and δ = 1, λ2 = 1.
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